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Denmark -  26th July 1984. 
 
Mrs. Geraldine Ferraro 
1725 Longworth House Office Building 
Washington DC , 20515 
U S A 
Dear Mrs. Ferraro, 
I take the liberty to write to you in order to send you 
the enclosed letter from professor Anderson, University of 
Minnesota, to Congressman Paul Simon and the reference to 
the "First-Strike capability"-statement by Caspar Weinberger. 
According to Robert Aldridge (author of The Counterforce 
Syndrome and First Strike! The Pentagon's Strategy for 
Nuclear War) the USA will have a perceived first strike 
capability by 1988 - and according to professor Johan 
Galtung of the University of Berlin, the US President and 
Secretary of Defense can (technically) order a first strike 
attack with strategic nuclear weapons on the USSR all alone, 
without having to inform or ask other members of the Admini -
stration, Congress , Prime Minister Thatcher, Chancellor Kohl 
or other people . 
I think I ought to inform you of that and to send you 
the enclos~d papers . 
I wish you all the luck in the world in beating Reagan/Bush 
(i . e . Reagan/Weinberger , maybe after all) . 
Yours sincerely , 
 
.. 
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" ' . 
l 
• 
I . : . ~ ,~F~ .~;: ill~. ..... , I ' ; f, • \! UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA TWIN dlTr~.s 
11£.CE\VED 
• I 
November 26, 1982 
The Honorable Paul Simon 
Member of Congress 
227 Cannon Rouse Off ice 
Washington, D. c. 20515 
Dear Congress~an Simon: 
-· .. 
Building 
I appreciate very much your letter of October 19 and am sorry 
it has taken me so long to respond. I am glad to hear:- .. that 
you have requested that the Government Accoun~ing Cffice begin 
an annual review of the dafcnse budget request. It has been 
clear that there has bt~cn too little well support:ccl "loyal 
opposition," and n.t the snmc time I rend in Franklin Spinney's 
report "Dui'onso Pn.ct~ of JJ.tfn" th~t ln the 111..?ntar;on oftr.11 
"hon cs t · c r it i c is rn g ct s con f us c d wit h d is 1 o y :.i l t y . " i\ t t hr 
same time some people, even the President, confuse blind 
loyalty with patriotism. 
As a loyal oppositionist, here is n summary of my view of the 
Administration's strntegic program, including Dense Pnck: 
I hn.vc grndu:tlly comn to sec clearly thn.t the /\clrninistr:i.tion's 
"nuclear wa.r-fightini::" str~teg~· metlr\~ FIRST STRTI-:i::-;- !\. prr.~m!')t1Ve 
, · attack aimed in one blow at destroying the.Soviet nuclear 
1 .51(.t;i'·i . -~§Q.!S. Herc is why: Two maJor t ct:hn ical prob l<:Jms \~it h fighting d'-J~ft:,,,u,- a nuc~ear war nave been pointed out this past >:ea~ 1n articles 
in Science. · 1) E~fP. Th e electromagnetic pulse effect casts a 
great deal of <loubt'ot1 the effectiveness of command, control, 
communications and intcllegence following a major nuclear atthck, 
0 and even following a minor one well placed. 2) Dust. Following 
3 the first attack, there will be enormous amounts of dust in the~ ~ air. Science~. (Sept. ?.5, 1981) pointer! out th:it the A)r For~P 
diGcoveretl t1iC cJ fr.ct of dust wh e n one of their jLJts flew th1·ough 
the plume of ~it. St. Helens and two of the engines quit. This 
effect was seen ngain when a Boc~ing 747 almost crashed near 
Jakarta last spring. Conclusion: You can't fly jct aircraft 
during a nuclear war with mushroom clouds all over the place. 
Not B .... ls, not ·cruise misr:;ile8, not any kind of j0t a .ircr:tft. . 
A thir.d factor is stratc~glc: Doth sicki-; tnlk in tlrnir litt~rn.tur•" 
abuut !'dec::ipltation attacks," strik0s on the cc 1H11~ind headqua..::ters. 
/\n obvious idea; if you c;111 destroy the command posts in the 
first wave, possibly no further attacks can be ordered, certainly 
fewer than if you donit attack command posts: 
.. 
' •. 
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The logical military· cone 1 us ion of. :ill of th is i th::i. t you rcal ly 
can't know whnt you will be able to du .after the irst . wurhends 
exp lode. . You. bat t .er prt?~n:r;-~ t9 . hi~ . u.1lJ.'Jt(~ the other !:;idc' s 
nuclear fo~c;ff!1}>.b'f!:~~¥·~ .. i;,hf?·~ietttt1 ·g«t:~:~a.rty .. o·f·"i ~t:lf@rtf o~ f th~ t;'t-ou nd 
or wa te:r •.. \\1'htt~\·/~~tf~ij'.1;,,Nii.v'ih:h".~ ·sai·~tli t:@~ (<YB'f.~ k must · be asstftrt~lJ 
des tr6'yed · thY~tktf·::tf't.~t :~~tU1~ f '.fb·r h1idcbtti~~. ti~t"'rcc t ioll or Tr itlen ts. 
Rely on the.bptimistfc.stntements about' very accurate i;uidn.nce 
systems on the MX mis·s i 1 cs. But, because of the inissi le f 1 igh t 
times of 15 to 30 minut~i, the .Soviets md~ ·still be able to launch 
on wnrning of our att:i.ck. ·' This ·problem is partially solved. by 
placing Pershing II missiles ih Europe where the flight time 
to targets in Western USSR is cut to 5 to 7 minutes. As u 
f in a 1 st e p , de v c 1 op 8. n ab i 1 i t y to tr r~ ck So v i et s u bm a r i t1 es . 
Hobert Aldrich, in his book Counterforce Svhdrome,has detailed 
all of this. 
The military iogic is '' appealing: The Cl'trrcnt doctrint~ of 
?.lutual Assured Destruction 01.1\D) says · that we will th.t'C?aten l ... 
the other side with an attack witich. if car'riccl uut, will destroy 
us as well o.~ the n.tt:i.ckr.1·. Jt :i.~ like lrn.vJnr; :t pU.~tol t:o 
,•, protect one !rum bur~ulars, whieh if fired kills both the 
attacker nnd the attn<~kml. t11 H\ICh n cn. ~H~, wu woult1 otrnily 
dccidt~ .to g~t rid or such n wnnpon. nut the US and SU have not 1 I 
been able to do so. · The theoreticians within the Reagan 
Administration have recognized this dilcmmu and have proposed 
to resolve it by developing a nuclear w~r-fighting strategy. 
Un'der~tanding of the three factors I mention above indicate 
that waiting for the uth8r slde to strike first really doesn't 1 I 
resolve the MAD doctrine. J\lso, it is our poliey to hit the 
Soviet Union with a nuclear attack i.f th~r tb.i.·c~ten ou.r "vit&l -- - t'f. 
int~rests" With :i conventional :itt::tcl<. Unlcs::> such :in.a.ltack 1 • 
destroys virtually all of tl1e Soviet nuclear capability in the 
first blow, it is suicidal. Nuclear war figHting can only me:i.n 
FIRST STnIKF.. Two vr1·y cnm1wtr.'.!11t. reo'plc hnve to.tel me that in 
a meeting for military engineers held at Mitre Corpor~tion in . 
Bedford, ~lnss. · in October 1981, Rlclrnrd de Luucr told the audience 
thnt "of course the MX and the Trident are not detcreht weapons; 
·,· they are preempt i vc st~ ikc wc.apons !' ~-. 
While giving a pruscnt:ttlon to Air Force Secretary Vern Orr an<l 
about 15 of his staff in June 1981, one of the colonels usked 
me: "Don't you think we wouid be safer with ·first 7 strikc capability 
bec:iuse the Soviets woulcl fear loss of thoir mi·l i tary equipment~?" 
li I could feel safer, it could only be because I was sure that 
~he Soviets neither had first-strike cup:i.bility nor were liable 
to get. 1 t for. .n lo n r. t j in o • But if th a t is tr u o , it u n cl c r cuts 
the· ar~umcnt give>n puhlic!n.J ly for the ~IX. One rnust eonclutle 
that the mil 1 tan: do cf; i nc.10cd want the ~IX as a preempt i v0 
strike weapon, in wl1ich case the basing motlc, Dense Puck or 
whatever, has no significance. I sec it us ncecssury to the 
i\ir Force only because they have spent so mueh of tlwir verbal 
caplt:tl convincing people th~l.t the Soviets nre about to strike. 
rt is in tcrestitl~ to note that the nrgument for Dense Pack--
frutricide--wns use by us severnl years ago ns one or thu many 
reasons that u first strike ntt:i.ck on the Minuteman makes no 
I 
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sense. An nttttc~oh ~ Minut~mun silo must use sever1tl wntheads 
if the kil1 probu.t!f1l!ity,,L\~s to be. high, Stl~ the first one to 
go off is l '!kdty·:, .. t·Oii-id·~~t:;;cb.11~-:;tktt otttars '.· 1:nl!.td·t~ they cfitt de~tro;J 
tht! :si loj~;.,..:~b. ~~1~·fp~~fottl'l:,y1·~:t¥f~¥ :~atfqur_f16l''.. of:{_t~1·~f.: ~. irst \vnrheitd 
count$* tH~·~ : nHi.t~~tt~Y:': ~·t!dh~lrltt' · ttt@ 1H11 t':iiobflbility over \vhn:t 
would exist ·if th~r~ wet-e \· no ft•a.tricid~. lh June 1981, while 
in the Pentagbn, I fbuld lhe ·Aii Fore~ ~~ople nrguing ~gainst 
the importance of fratricide. · Thus, .· ! wa~ . most surprised 
nine months later to learn that .. they us~ fratricide to ju~tify 
Dens~ Pack. · · · 
More fundamentally, the Joint Chiefs themselves ilavE:? undercut 
~he . ~arg~m..~,nt. ·~-~~t ... .!,he . So~ letq .. mqy ntJe.~pt_ .. ~ .f :trst . ~.t.r .ike on 
ttte·1111nutemen. · "To my sutprise, I found the following sentences 
in t.he 1983 Military Posture Statement on page 21 in the upper 
right corner: 
"Analyses p:rojeet thnt a Soviet strike ng~tinst US missile 
fields could dN::l:rny :i. mn,1nr po1·tion of t.lin T.18 !Cm! forcr'! 
if the US chooHos to ride out the attn.ck before responding. 
However, the SovictR would Atill hnvo to contend with the 
US SLDM forcc--sccurc nnd survivable nt sc~--nnd the 
manned bombers that had been launched for survival ~t the 
first confirmed warning of attack." 
The Soviet leaders would have to assume· thnt we would ride ou't 
the attack and not launch on warnin~ eve~ though the itinutcmen 
have been designed from the beginning to be lnunchcd very 
quickly. They would have to trust us completely , even though 
in past y8ars the Anr1un.l Report of the Secretary of_Q.c::J.cr1s~ 
has Stttt'ect-that Wi:? Wottrd t1ot say \IJT\efncr t)r no~t we wotilcl launch 
on warning. Having known this for mttny yen.rs, it has been a 
continual puzzle to me as to how the non could have convincC!d 
so many people that the Soviets may strike the Minutemen. 
The Joint Chiefs add a second fundnm~ntal ptoblcim for thu 
Soviet leadership. They would have to assume beyond a shadow 
of n doubt that we would not respond with our submarines and 
.. . bombers. through the above stu t em en ts, the Jo int Chiefs have 
shown why the ~IX is not needed as a re ta 1 ia tory ' wen.pen. I ts 
only use can be in a FIRST STRIKE. 
A major argument against a Soviet first strikq on the? ~linut8men 
has been that there is ~~rcat uncertainty. In the Spring 1982 
· issu~ of Strategic Review, General Robert T. Marsh states: 
"To the extent thnt .. uncertainty discuurn.gcs u first-strike-:: 
d~cision, it iR rortunuto thnt uncortninly nbountls in 
this dangerous world wherein the strategic balance re~ts 
on ·mutual dctci·rencc." 
Yet, he goes on to !:>UY tha.t ' we must tn.ke into 'account t110 cn.pn.bility 
o~ the adversary, implying that there is .a chnnce the Soviets 
could succc~d even ln ti1c face of i;i·c:it un~crL:.duty . 
... 
I 
... 
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Until a fe\v rnonths . n.~o •it ~ :.felt that urtc~tt,tittty of t 1he outcome 
of ttn ul\tes.tiible mtt!:s.: 11l~:e8.bkil.~a :fir~t sti4i~~L.i;.w6ttld bt:! suf:f icient 
to stay ,ti1~ ~· hili1d~~:r.~.,:i.if'Y:·:pote. tit·.inl;Jtttit:::1.eker:a~nu t now:nt .nm, not 
so ~·!:ur~~~t;.t*L~§:t;~;J\li'~~·L'::_ t.\'wn~'.::: :tsk.ed .''.it~  .. i·@v1~"-~;.a·. ptlp~X' B'ii. the .. 
Directb11-'bf· Sttll."'tett:i'c!'• Aha1Ysis· of·~: tR~' tUJM' ·~6tbora t ibti i br ,. Estt?s. 
The theme of his :b~P~t .wn~ thai the di~dU~~ibri of missile 
vulnerabilit~ h~s ral~ed the !ssu@ of une~rthinty to major 
strategic itnportarice 1 implying that · it haciri c1 t been und that it 
should be. He ga~s bn to say th~t . if it 1~ accepted that we 
should take into account uncertainty in our own force asses~­
ments 1 we should likewise take into account the unc~~tainties 
the So~iets would face in their strategic ~lnnning . In October ! 
I received two papers ftom a former Air Force Col. Rane, indicating 
th~t he hnd been trying for years to get the senior plann~rs to 
understand probability and that computer sirn'ul::i.tions cannot be 
trusted for guidance in strn. tegic plnnnirtg, but may · be quite 
misleading~ There is a real yearning for bertninty in an 
uncertain world. Thus statements such as "the Soviet SS-18 
has a 93 percent kill 'probnbility n~ninst tho Mi nutemen silos." 
There is a.bsolu tely nd' wny to n.tr i ve u t sue h n stat etnen t. If 
on~ hnd teRted mnny flr~t strikes, thq most anc could . ~ivc would 
bo n rnnge of kill probnbiliti~s bnscd on ~ certnln prostuted 
level of confidence. Without tests, such probability stn.ternents 
are either lies or ignornncc. 
The gen~rnls know that you cn.ri't fight a nuclear war. Gen. ,, 
David Jones said so upon his retirement. Gunernl Marsh, in the 
abovementioned issue of Strntcglc Review acknowledges the snme 
in the last pnrn.grn.ph of his rebuttal. After reading Willinrn 
_,.,.., -·-·~Sh.Q?:'.Q~~~Qle~'With: En~ugh Shuve:l:s" I ~enme . int:-rl!'t!Sfrq:rly .• -. • 
convinced that the civilian leadership is taking ~ pafh that 
the military leader$hfp would not advise. I·f they have convinced 
themselves und almost ·avcryonc else thnt the Soviets may strike 
f lrst nt otir ~nnd-bnsed rcmls, they must conclud~, believing 
also in our ·superior technology, that we could do the same to 
them nnd ought to obtain that crtpaDility. In such nn environ-
'/ ment, uncertaiuty gives way to certn.Jrtty--only theh cn.n one 
· believe that we could limit our losses to an ncceptable level ~­
by striking first. As Franklin Spinney commented, "honest 
critic ism gets conrt'.iscd with disloyn.l ty. '! In s uch an u tmosphere· 
the most bizzare and hawkish views prcvn.il. 
Anderson 
1 
.,... 
.. 
